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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
P~-\TRICI~ SlTLLI\~~-\X ~-\XD

ELIZABETH
his 'vife,

Sl.'"LLI\'"~-\~,

Plaintiffs a·nd Appellants,
YS.

JOHN G.

CO~"'D~-\S,

Defenda-nt a.nd

Respondent.

Respondent's Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Appellants are the owners of ninety-seven acres of
land located about three miles from Park City, in Summit County, in what is known as White Pine Canyon,
and which was patented to the heirs of Hyrum P. Workman, February 5th, 1906. (Ex. A.) The respondent is
the owner of approximately thirteen hundred acres of
land located in the same canyon and above the lands of
the appellants. The means of ingress and egress to and
from the lands of the respondent has been by a road
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leading from the main traveled highway, near Park City,
up White Pine Canyon, and over a portion of the appellants' land. This suit was commenced in the year 1927
and by the complaint the appellants claim damages for
alleged trespass by the respondent during the years 1925,
1926 and 1927, in taking his sheep over the premises of
the appellants. Appellants also seek an injunction to
restrain the respondent from going upon said premises
in the future.
Respondent denied the trespass and alleged damage
and alleged by way of an amended counter-claim that
his only means of ingress and egress to and from his lands
is and has been the roadway up White Pine Canyon,
VI hich extends· over appellants' lands which roadway the
respondent alleged is a public highway and has been used
continuously by the general public for more than sixty
years. Respondent also claims that by reason of the
continuous and uninterrupted use of said highway, for
more than twenty years, the respondent and his predecessors in interest had and have a right in said roadway
by preseri ption.
At the commencement of the trial the appellants dismissed their claim for damages, and so the sole and only
issue which was presented for determination was whether
or not a public highway was established over the appellants' premises, which respondent has a right to use
in going to and from the lands owned by him. The court
found that such a highway has existed for more than
fifty years and decreed that the respondent, his agents,
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serYants and employees haYe a right to use said roadwar for drh·ing sheep, cattle and other livestotl~. and
for all kinds of traffic, in the use. occupancy and enjoyment of the said lands of the respondent. The roadway
established by the decree is specified as three rods 'vide,
that is to say, one and one-half rods on each side of a
center line. the courses and distances of "rhich are particularly described in the decree.

_-\RGUMEKT.

In their brief appellants contend

(1) That the
amended counter-claim is insufficient to support the
judgment. in that it fails to particularly describe by
"metes, bounds, Yariations, dimensions, courses and distances" the particular high"-ay which respondent claims
the right to use; (2) that the evidence is insufficient to
establish any public highway in White Pine Canyon and
particularly the highway described in the findings and
decree, as extending over appellants' property.
In his amended counter-claim the respondent, after
alleging the ownership of his lands and describing them,
and that they are located in White Pine Canyon and
are chiefly valuable for grazing purposes, sets forth
that other persons own lands in said canyon above and
below the lands of the respondent and"5. That there is now and has been for more
than sixty years last past a well traveled road
up said White Pine Canyon, branching from the
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main state highway and running through and beyond the said lands of the defendant and through
the lands owned in said canyon by said other persons. That said road is a public highway and has
been used continuously by the defendant and by his
predecessors in interest and by the aforesaid owners
of land in said White Pine Canyon and vicinity
and by the public generally, and especially by the
residents of Park City and of Summit County,
State of Utah, for more than sixty years last
past. That defendant does claim the right to
use said road for ingress to and egress from his
said land in White Pine Canyon. That said road
runs through a portion of the tract of land described in the first paragraph of plaintiffs' com ..
plaint . herein, to wit: Lot 8, Section 1, Township
2 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Meridian.
"6. The defendant alleges that said road re..
ferred to in paragraph five of this counter-claim
was at the time of the commencement of this
action a public highway by prescription, and by
having been used continuously, openly, notoriously
and under· claim of right by the public generally
and by the defendant and by his predecessors in
interest for more than twenty years." (Tr. 33.)
Respondent further alleges that he has constructed
upon his said premises valuable improvements, at an
investment of more than $6500.00, and that he made these
expenditures with the knowledge on the part of the ap ..
pellants of the necessity for the use of said road by
respondent, and that appellants acquiesced in such use
of said highway at all times while respondent was making
said expenditures and improvements, and respondent there..
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fore claims that appellants are estopped from asserting
that there is no high,vay over their said lands.
Considering appellants• first objection \Ve call atten . .
tion to the fact that it is alleged in paragraphs 9 and 10
of the counter-claim that the attempt by the respondent
to make use of this high,vay "·as interfered \Yith in this:
that the appellants have forbidden the defendant to in
any manner use said road. It also appears ( Tr. 438)
that the trial court"s attention 'vas called to the fact
that "-hen the respondent was attempting to make a sur ..
vey of the roadway over the appellants' property that
the surveyor was ordered off the premises and that the
appellants would not permit the survey to be completed;
that it was therefore necessary for respondent to apply
to the court for an order permitting the survey to be
made. This, of course, occurred during the trial. At
pages 479 to 486 of the transcript the hostile attitude
of the appellants is further evidenced by the fact that
counsel in open court stated that his clients declined to
permit the survey to be made and the colloquy between
court and counsel resulted in the court's order requiring
the appellants to permit the survey to be completed. We
call attention to these portions of the record as indicating
that the attitude of appellants has been such as to make
it extremely difficult for the respondent to acquire spe. .
cific data as to the particular route of the highway over
appellants' premises, until after the court had ordered the
appellants to pennit the survey to be made. However, we
do not regard the objection to the cross-complaint as
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well taken for the reason that although it may be the
better practice that a road or highway or other easement,
in which a right is claimed, should be particularly described, that rule is for the information of the person
over whose land the right of way is claimed, and he may
waive the objection that the description is too general
by failing to file timely objection to the complaint by way
of special demurrer. In this case the appellants filed
no special demurrer to the counter-claim of the respondent and therefore they waived any objection to the counterclaim for lack of particularity in the description of the
roadway.
In the fifth cause of action, paragraph two, of appellants' complaint, it is alleged:
"That on or across the lands of plaintiffs
herein described and on and across the lands of
the defendant herein mentioned there is an old,
worn-out, un-used, except by the defendant for
the three years last past, roadway or wagon track,
but that said roadway or track has not been used
by anyone other than the plaintiffs and the defendant for more than twenty years last previous
to the year 1924, nor has said roadway been so used
by the defendant herein for a. period greater than
four years last past, and that said roadway or trail
is not a county or state highway, nor is the same
a public highway in any degree at all, nor has it
ever been such." (Abs. 10.)
The defendant denied that this roadway was not a
public highway and put in, without objection, evidence
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to sno" that this road "·as a public hig·h,vay. The appellants k11e'v the course of this road,vay through their
pren1ises and they could not haYe been better advised had
the definite and specific description, as shown by the
surYey. been set forth in the cross-complaint and counterclaim. The description as giYen by the surveyor and
included in the findiDoas and decree follows specifically
along the course of this old road"·ay referred to in the
complaint and the cross-complaint. Cases cited by counsel, 'Which seem to indicate that a specific description of
any easement claimed should be set forth in the complaint. refer to easements or priYate rights of way. It
would seem that the public, and particularly a property
owner over 'Whose property the highway passes, is charged
with knowledge of the course and extent of such highway,
and therefore the necessity of alleging specifically the
description of a highway is not as important and necessary as would be a description of an easement or roadway which one might claim over the lands of another.
9

In Poole Ys. Greer (Del.) 65 Atl. 767, the court uses
this language :

"The defendant contends that the first count
of the declaration is fatally defective because it
describes the right of way as 'toward the Holcomb
Road' and does not otherw~e designate the terminus. We think this is a matter of greater particularity and description and should have been
raised on special demurrer, if at all, and may
not now be considered under the issues made by
the pleadings."
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See also:
Anteurieth vs. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 30
Mo. App. 254.
Coming now to the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain the findings and judgment establishing the highway over appellants' property. The court permitted to
be introduced in evidence a survey made by witness
Heath, who particularly describes the highway and it
is this description that is set out in the findings and
decree. Counsel insist repeatedly that there is no evidence
that the road up White Pine Canyon extended along the
course as given in Heath's survey, but that the evidence
shows that whatever roadway did exist up that canyon
varied entirely from the route fixed by Heath.
We shall call attention to the testimony of numerous
witnesses, not only as to the existence of this road, but
as to its location, so as to show that the findings and
decree are amply supported by the proof.
WILLIAM AR·CHIBALD, a resident of Snyderville,
testified:
Q. How long have you known White Pine
and Red Pine Canyons and the canyons adjacent
to Snyderville?
A. Since 1870.
Q. Do you know that particular ranch referred to here as the Sullivan Ranch, that Sullivan claims?
A. Yes.
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Do you know the Condas Ranch?
Yes. sir.
Q. Do you kno'v the ranches in the vicinity
of White Pine and Red Pine Canyons?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. \\rhere is White Pine Canyon "·ith reference to the Condas and Sullivan Ranches?
~-\.
They are both situated in the mouth
of White Pine Canyon.
-Q. Each ranch 'vith reference to the lower
and upper portion of the canyon-how are they
located, these t'vo ranches?
_-\. The Sullivan ranch is down north of the
Condas ranch.
Q. How much land do you own in that localI'ty'.
A. In that township I own 99.3 acres.
Q. State whether or not there is a roadway
leading from the Park City main highway up
to the plaintiffs'; that is up to the Sullivan
ranch and up to the Condas ranch?
. -\.
.
Yes, sir, there is. (Tr. 149-150.)
Q.

~-\.

The witness then gives a general description of the
route of the road and then further testifies:
What is the course of this roadway with
reference to White Pine Canyon?
A. It goes right up into White Pine Canyon,
up into the basin.
Q. How long have you known this road?
A. Well, that road has been changed maybe
a rod or two rods in a place there.
Q. Now, just describe the road you are referring to, and the course of the road and that has
Q.
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been changed a rod or two rods, you may tell us
that?
A. Mr. Lake and Mr. Redden, I believe, had
this ranch as co-partners before Mr. Sullivan,
and there is a flat there that we had a sawmill
on there; I think that was about 1~76; I worked
for Gibson at the sawmill and I was shipping clerk
and foreman, and this was placed upon the ground
after the brush was cleaned off, and they changed
the course of that road up a little farther towards
the bench.
Farther to the west?
A. Farther to the west; but there, oh, maybe fifteen rods inside the line between Mr. Sullivan and I, our sleeping cabin used to be up that
road that turns in from the west, you will see
a road going off this bench on to the hollow
there, brought logs down to the mill. This was
changed for convenience to make a piece of hay
land there, changed for their convenience.
Q.

Q. That is for the convenience of Lake and
Redden?
A. Yes, Lake and Redden.

How long have you known to your own
knowledge there has been a roadway leading up
along in a general way the present course of the
road which we saw yesterday?
A. Since 1873.
·Q.

Q. And to what extent, of your own knowledge, since 1873, and in what manner has this
roadway been used?
A. For hauling lumber, for driving stock,
up in the hills, and for hauling wood and general
building material for the settlement in the shape
of timber.
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Q. Has this road"·ay been used generally by
the public for t hest'\ purposes·:
~-\.
Yes. sir.
Q. During that entire period?
.A.. l~ es. sir.
Q. X O\Y. do you kno\Y. and has the course
of this present road \Yhich you have referred to been
generally along the course of the present road
which ''"e sa''" up there ~·esterday, \Yith the exception, which you say. it was moved a little
westerly in order to leaYe the meado\v clear for
grazing and raising crops"?
~~It has run in that direction.
Q. Do you know the circumstances or why
it was that this road was moved to the west
some short distance?
_-\.. ".,.ell, only I would take it that it was
done to benefit this ranch.
Q. Do you know who moved the road from
the meadow that is the center of that little
meadow over to the west side of that meadow?
_-\.. Yes, sir, Frank Lake and Mr. Redden.
Q. Do you know about when that was?
A. Xo, I cannot exactly say, I know approximately. It must have been about twelve
years ago.

X ow state during the time you have
known this road; state whether or not it has
been a well defined and well traveled road?
A. Yes, sir, well defined and well traveled
road.
Q.

Is there any means, Mr. Archibald, of
ingress and egress to White Pine Canyon, other
than along the course of this road?
A. No, sir.
Q.
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And in order that Mr. Condas may go
to his ranch, is there any way possible of his
getting to his ranch from any other roadway
than this?
A. No, sir. There is no other way. The
other is all fenced up. (Tr. 151-155.)
Q.

Mr. Archibald further testified that at an early date
the road up White Pine Canyon was used by loggers up
until 1903 (Tr. 167) for hauling lumber from two sawmills (one located on the flat by the Sullivan house, and
the other about a mile and a quarter above the ~Condas
house) which operated prior to 1878. (Tr. 169-170.)
That it was the main traveled road from the Sullivan
ranch and the ~condas ranch and used by the public generally (Tr. 190-191); that wood was hauled out of this
White Pine Canyon for the purpose of roasting ores at
the mines up to about 1900 and that the road was never
obstructed until the Sullivans went into possession of
the property now owned by them.
(Tr. 191.) He
further states that the road was also used since the
saw-mills ceased operations for the trailing of livestock
which were taken to graze in that section of the country.
(Tr. 192-193.)

THOMAS L. POWERS testified that he owns a
ranch north of White Pine Canyon and a quarter of a
mile distant; that he has known that canyon for thirtyfive years; that he drove cattle up there thirty-three years
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ago and that the road in that canyon has been used by

the public.

He further testified:

You know "·here the White Pine Canyon
road now runs as it passes up there through the
Sullivan and Condas ranches, do you not?
. \.
.
·Yes, sir, I kno'v "·here it runs now.
Q.. ·yes. Is that r()('Uj a.s it is or no-w passes
thnmgh those places 81thsta.ntially in the same place
a.s it has aluYl.ys been.. ·when it passed thru those
pl4ce s as yo·u hll. r e kno·lc-n them?
...~. EJ:cept foo- a slight change.
Q. What slight change has been made?
. -\..
.
It has been moved closer to the north side
of the canyon, closer to Mr. Sullivan's or Lake's
house.
Q. That is it has been moved from the
meadow a short distance from the west side towards
the house:
. -\..
.
Yes.
Q. That is, the road as 'YUYW constituted is
the sam.e road that passed through the SullivOJYt
a1Ul Coodas ranches, the same rot:ul as has b·een
there since you have lcnown it?
A. Yes, since I have known it.
Q. During the time that you have known
this road has there ever been any interference or
obstruction in the road until the plaintiff in this
case fenced it?
A. No, I have not known of any obstruction.
When they went in there Mr. Redden took up
the Condas place and Mr. Lake, I cannot say for
sure whether Mr. Lake put a gate there or not, but
it always was so it could be opened. I don't know
whether Mr. Lake put a gate there. I cannot say
for sure, but after it was there it was so it could
be opened.
Q.
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Q.

So the public could go through just the

same?
A.

Yes.
Q. There was never any attempt to stop the
public going through to your knowledge?
A. I don't think Mr. Lake or Mr. Redden
ever tried to stop anyone. (Tr. 198-199.)

On cross-examination Mr. Powers testified:
I understand you to say the road as it
approaches the Sullivan land has been moved from
where it was nearer to the foot hills?
A. Yes, a slight change.
Q. Do you remember the time that mill stood
there?
A. No, that was before my time.
·Q. When you say a slight change you mean
what-three or four rods?
A. Not that much.
Q. Two rods?
A. Oh, probably one rod.
Q. And that change has been made along the
entire line of the road?
A. Not the entire distance. Some part of it
might be changed about a rod, some a half a
rod.
Q. Some about two rods?
A. That is what I say. Some of it is on the
same ground it always was.
Q. But there has been a complete change
in the road over the hay land?
A. I would not call it complete.
Q. What I mean is the entire road has been
moved farther up the hillside, so as to make more
room for the hay land below?
A. Yes, I guess it has. (Tr. 205-206.)
Q.
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The real intent of the \vitness 'vas to testify to thl\
same change in the road mentioned by "·itness Archibald.

DAY'"E SX'YDER, 8ixty-one years of age, testified

that the road had been up 'Yhite Pine Canyon as long
as he could remember and that it had been used by the
public for hauling "·ood~ driYing stock, hauling logs and
mining timbers. (Tr. 209.)

*

*

*

*

Q. Was this rooo as it pa8Ses over the Sulliran ranch in the sam.e place in the early days as
it iJ; nozc?
~-\.
:yes:. si.·r.
Q. Has there been some minor changes?
.A. '""ery small ones, if any, to my knowledge.
Q. ~That is the nature of the minor changes?
A. \\""ell, to the benefit of the Sullivan people
and Lake people.
Q. Just state how it was changed to their
benefit?
A. A little to the west nearer the hill.
Q. Nearer the hill to admit or afford more
meadow for owners of the land ?
A. Yes.
Xow, in the days of logging, when there was
a good deal of timber work along this highway,
was the road wide enough so teams could pass?
A. Yes, sir; in fact it was always wide as
you would need it for any purpose, I believe.
It was never closed up.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
Was it wide enough for teams to pass and
for livestock to be trailed along it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did these teams going up and down
pass each other?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did livestock trail in a general way
along the roadway?
A. Right along the roadway where we used
to take ours.
Q. And that is true along the roadway as it
passes through the Sullivan ranch?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever know of this roadway being
obstructed by anyone up to the time Sullivan got
on this ranch?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did the public generally use and treat it
as a public highway?
A. Open as far as I know, but never closed
in any way.
Q. And is this the only road that is useable
in order to get up White Pine Canyon?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And White Pine Canyon in these early
days was used for the purpose of getting out logs,
cordwood, for the purpose you mentioned, and in
later years was used extensively for what purpose.?
A. Stock and sheep later years.
Q. And since used for sheep. Have sheep
trailed up this road in order to get into White
Pine Canyon?
_A. Yes, sir, I think so. (Tr. 210-211.)
Q.

On cross-examination he testified that there has been
no change in the road, except there was a change for
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a very short distance just belo'v the Condas house, nnd
another cha11oae "rhereby the road \vas put up nearer the
hill for the benefit of the Sullivan n1eado,v, this latter
change being made for the benefit of the then owners of
the Sullivan land.
RUFl.:S J. B.-\ILEY, age sixty-four years, testified:
That he has kno,vn \Yhite Pine Canyon for twentysix or twenty-se\"en years; that there was a roadway up
the canyon, a fair road for a wagon ; that he started
trailing sheep up \Yhite Pine Canyon twenty-four years
ago; that he took his supplies for his camp up the canyon
in a cart, the front wheels of a '\\1'agon; that the road in
places was two or three rods wide. ( Tr. 227-229.)

TRACY WRIGHT testified that he has been familiar
with White Pine Canyon since 1919, and has used the
road since 1919, and has used the road since that year
for the trailing of livestock and for the hauling of provisions in wagons; that the road has been up that canyon
ever since he has known the canyon; that it was a good
canyon road; that he has met lots of people going up
and down this road; that he has seen people on horseback
and up to the Condas ranch in automobiles; that he knew
of sheep being trailed and of vehicular traffic up the road
since 1919 ; that the sheep were trailed over a width of
about four rods; and in some places not over a rod or
rod and a half. (Tr. 236-238.) He further testified:
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Who was with you at the time you took
your sheep up, Mr. Wright?
A. I had some horses with me.
Q. What years did you first take them up
there?
A. My father has taken them up that trail
since 1892.
Q. When did you, first years, accompany and
take the sheep up that canyon?
A. That is pretty hard to tell. I have helped
father all my life since I was large enough.
Q. Well, as near as you can tell me now?
A. Well, I will say I am positive since 1913.
Q. Since 1913?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The trail that you had been using over
the Sullivan land was the upper trail that goes
over the brush?
A. For the sheep, but the other I have used
for automobile, horses and pack outfits, that went
up by his house and to Condas.
Q. Has there ever been any objection by Mr.
Sullivan?
A. No, sir. (Tr. 240-241.)
Q.

On cross-examination he testified:
That there has been no objection to the use of the
road; that there were some gates there since about 1921,
which could be opened and closed. (Tr. 241-242.)
DELBERT REDDEN testified:
That he has known White Pine Canyon since 1900;
that the highway has been used since that time for haul-
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ing timbers, logs and poles, by stockmen and sheepmen,
including himself. and also by the farmers. That he "·a~
interested in the SulliYan ranch "·ith Frank Lake in
1906 to 1~)08.
Q. Trhilf you and hf lrcre interested, or a.t
the tinze you lce-re interested in the Sulli l'a.n ra.nch,
lchere did this ll"hite Pl:ne CaHyo·n road go as 'it
passed altmg thrau. gh thf Sullit.·an. ranch?
~-\..
WeU. pract·ically z~n the samze place it is

toda.y, e:2·cept a jezc feet lo-wer dozen.
Q. And state what, if any. change was made
in those few feet on the lower end you spoke
about·?
.A. \Yell. they grubbed off the brush and
moved the road maybe five or eight feet on the
lower end.
Q. What was the purpose of that?
A. To get more meadow land. .
Q. Who moved that road farther west and
along the foot of the hill to get more meadow
land?
.A.. ...-\.t the lower end you mean?
Q. Yes.
A. Mr. Lake.
Q. And after the road was moved by Mr.
Lake, state whether or not the public generally
did use that road, as it had been changed to the
foot of the hill?
A. Just the same. (Tr. 258-261.)
Q. What were your observations as to how
the road was used and who used it and the frequency with which it was used during the time
you lived there from 1912 to 1923?
A. During the summer season sheepmen up
and down all the time; cattlemen up and down
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all the time; lots of strangers. I saw lots, a few
traveling over towards Ogden, and during the
chicken law, when the chicken law was open, ten
or fifteen years, seen at my house pretty nearly
every year. I saw a couple of men in a car that
had traveled up that trail. Wright has traveled
up and down that canyon all the time I lived
there.
Q. During that entire period did you ever see
the road obstructed?
A. No, sir. (Tr. 266-267.)
Q. Were you on the road from time to time
and were you in a position to see whether the
road was obstructed?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. During the time that you traveled back
and forth over this highway leading to and from
your place up there, did anyone who was on the
Sullivan ranch, or Mr. Lake, or anyone else,
question or make any obstruction-question your
right or make any objection to your using that
road?
A. No, sir. (Tr. 268.)

He further testified that where the road passed
through the Sullivan ranch and up to the Condas house
it was two rods wide in some places and others three
rods "\vide. (Tr. 276.)
On cross-examination he testified that the highway
over the Trottman Lane to the Condas house was two
or three rods wide. (Tr. 290.)
On redirect examination he testified that from
1898 to 1923 the road was used by numerous persons,
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"·hose names he giYes. for trailing sheep, and that he
made the change in the road "~here it crosses over the
meadow· land. That he never stopped anybody from
using the road. (Tr. 2H7 -298.)
JOHN COND. -\S.
.
the respondent. testified:
That he has been familiar \vith 'Vhite Pine Canyon
since 1924 and that he purchased his ranch from Mr.
Redden; that there was a road leading up to his place
in 1924: and 1925, when he became interested in the
property; and that the road was traveled by the general
public. That in 1926 SulliYan put a gate across the
road to keep the stock from getting into his hay land.
That in 1926 Sullivan told him he wanted to put a lock
on the gate for a few days, because he didn't have any
man to watch his cattle; that he gave Condas a key
so that he could travel the road ; said he didn't care for
other people. (Tr. 307.) He further testified that he
had used the road to travel up and down with his sheep
since 1925 ( Tr. 308) , and that two or three or four rods
was necessary for this purpose. (Tr. 311.)
JOHN R. LAKE, witness for the plaintiffs, testified:
That he lived on the Sullivan ranch from 1911
to 1917 ; that his father changed the road where it used
to run through the Sullivan meadows and built it farther
to the west, near the hill, so he could save meadow.
(Tr. 526-527.)
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WILLIAM ARCHIBALD testified on rebuttal :
That he hauled wood over this road as late as 1890
or 1891 (Tr. 548) ; that the road was used for hauling
cord wood fron1 1878 down to 1893; that he hauled cord
wood down to the mines and that when the price of silver
went down the mines closed ( Tr. 548-549), and he named
a number of people who made use of this road to show
that it was used by the general public. He states that
the road was used as a public road continuously from
1873 (Tr. 550) ; that the road from Snyderville up to
Dragtown went clear up the canyon; that the road
marked "A" on appellants' exhibit "C" (which is the
road claimed by the respondent) was a public traveled
road. ( Tr. 556.)

DELBERT REDDEN testified on rebuttal:
That except for the change made at the gate between
the Condas and Sullivan ranches, to make more meadow
land, the road has never been changed since 1914.
(Tr. 629-631.)
Q. Mr. Redden you heard Mr. Sullivan testify
that he moved the road above his house leading
toward the Condas ranch ten or fifteen feet to the
west towards the hillside?
Q. Is that a fact?
A. No, sir, the road has never been changed
by Mr. Sullivan hims.elf up to the gate; this piece
of road you are speaking of.
Q. Yes?
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A. Up until the time I changed it from t ht.'
s"-amp to the hill.
Q. That 'vas in 191-1?
.A. 191-1.
Q. But the location of the road has never
been cha11oaed fron1 the SulliYan place to the
Condas ranch:
.A.. Just the same. (Tr. 631.)

He testified that he helped construct the gate at
the northeast corner of the Sullivan ranch in 1915 (Tr.
632). and he further testified as to a conversation he had
with Mr. Lake, at the time the gate was constructed.
He testified after they got the fence built from Sullivan's
fence, north end of his land up to Redden's gate, to
keep the cattle from coming from Snyderville to come
in on both of them, he said, "Have you any objection to
putting up a fence?" Redden said, "No, not in the least."
He had a few potatoes and had them fenced in. He said,
"It will keep your horses in and strays from coming in
from Snyderville." He said, "After we get the fence
up we will open the gate and leave it open." That is
what happened.
Q.

That is the gate was left open after that

time?
A.

Yes.
Was there ever a lock on that gate?
A. No time that I ever knew of.
Q. Did you have a lock on the gate between
Lake's place and your place?
A. Never. (Tr. 633.)
Q.
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The court will bear in mind that the respondent is
claiming the road "A," as shown on appellants' Exhibit
"C," which runs on the north and right hand side of the
canyon going up and that road is shown as the road
surveyed by Heath. (See Heath map introduced in evidence.) Heath testified that his survey shows the road
just as it is located through the Sullivan tract (Tr. 647),
and this is the road that the court establishes as. a public highway by his findings and decree.
Having shown that there has been a used road or
highway up White Pine Canyon since 1873 and that it
has been used for all purposes by the general public,
and that said road has always been ·substantially along
the route of its present location, we are now to show
that under the facts the court was justified, as a matter
of law, in entering a decree herein, establishing said
road as a public highway.
This road existed prior to the time that the Sullivan
land was patented on February 5th, 1906, and therefore
the owners of the Sullivan land acquired it from the
government ·subject to the highway easement. Section
4919, United States Compiled Statutes (Revised Stat., Sec.
2477), provides:
"RIGHT OF WAY FOR HIGHWAYS OVER
PUBLIC LANDS. The right of way for the construction of highways over public lands not reserved for public use is hereby granted."
In the case of Verdier vs. Port Royal Rd. Co., 15 S. E.
476, it is held that under the section above quoted a
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grant of right of \Yay is valid as against a subsequent
conveyance by the government of the land, by metes and
bounds, to a private person.

See also Flint & P. M. Ry. Co. vs. Gardo
(1\fich.) 2 N. W. 648.
In Montgomery vs. Sommers (Ore.) 90 Pac. 674, it
is said:

"The .A.ct of Congress referred to by the court
is an express dedication of a right of way, and
an acceptance of the grant wbile the land is a part
of the public domain may be effected by public
user alone, without any action on the part of
the public highway authorities. When an acceptance thereof has once been made the highway
is legally established and thereafter a public easement upon the land and entrymen and claimants
take subject to such easement."
A settler on public lands on which there is a road
in common use as a highway takes subject to the public
easement in such way, though it was never established
by the public authorities under the general road laws.
Van Wanning vs. Deeter (Neb.) 110 N. W.
703; 112 N. W. 902.
The foregoing section of the statute constitutes a
grant in 'JWaesenti and when accepted by the public takes
effect as of the date of the grant. That is to say the
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grant remains in abeyance until the highway is established
and takes effect from that date.
McAllister vs. Okonogan Co. (Wash.) 100
Pac. 146.
Stofferan vs. Okonogan Co. (Wash.) 136 Pac.
484.

Butte vs. Mikosowitz (Mont.) 102 Pac. 593.
The fact that bars or gates were constructed across
the public highway does not affect one's rights to the
use of the high way and is not an assertion of any right
inconsistent with the use of the road as a highway.
In Eldredge vs. Collins (Neb.) 105 N. W. 1085, the
court declares :
"It is true the evidence shows that during
the winter season from 1891 to 1895 the owners
of lands adjoining the road sometimes stretched
wire across it to connect fences on either side,
but from the entire evidence we are satisfied that
such obstructions never amounted to an assertion
of any right inconsistent with the easement of
the public, because the public used the road, notwithstanding such obstructions, and submitted to
the inconvenience, not in recognition of any right
inconsistent with their use of the road as a highway, but as an act of grace and out of regard for
the interests of the land owners during that
period."
In Sprague vs. Steed (·Colo.) 139 Pac. 544, gate·s
were constructed across the public highway, but the pub-
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lie continued to use the road. The fact that the gates
"·ere so constt·ucted in no ''"ay affected the publie'~ right
to the use of the road. Sprague brought an action for
damages and trespass. complaining that Steed had broken
the locks on the gates. It appeared that the road "' hich
was fenced off by the gate extended through the land
belonging to Sprague. long before patent had been issued
to such land. The court held that the defendant had a
right to the use of the highway.
The rights granted by the United States Statutes
cover and include, not only high"·ays used as wagon roads,
but also li\estock trails, used by the general public for
driving their flocks and herds from one range to another.
Hatch Bros. YS. Block (Wyo.) 165 Pac. 518.
Bishop vs. Hawley (Wash.) 238 Pac. 284.
:Montgomery Ys. Sommers (Ore.) 90 Pac. 674.
Respondent also claims that he has a right to use
said highway because it has become established as such
pursuant to the laws of this state.
When this road was established the Statutes of Utah
Territory then in effect, Chapter 29, Laws of 1880, provided:
"Section 2. Highways are roads, streets or
alleys and bridges laid out or erected by the public,
or if laid out or erected by others, dedicated or
abandoned to the use of the public.
Section 3. Roads laid out and regarded ~s
highways by the county court and all roads used
as such for a period of five years are highways."
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Chapter 12, Laws of 1886, Section 2, provided:
"All roads, streets, alleys and bridges laid
out or erected by others than the public and dedicated or abandoned to the use of the public are
highways. A highway shall be deemed and taken
as dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously and uninterruptedly used as a public thoroughfare for a pe·riod
of ten years."

This last quoted statute was carried into the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1888, Section 2066.
The Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898, Section 1114,
provide:
"In all counties of this state all roads, streets,
alleys, lanes, cros·s places, trails and bridges laid
out or erected as such by the public, or dedicated
or abandoned to the public, or made such in actions
for partition of real property are public highways."

In construing this statute this court, in the case of
Wilson vs. Hull, 7 Utah 90, 24 Pac. 799, declared:
"There being in Utah Territory no statute
covering any formal acceptance by officers. or
agents in charge of public roads of land dedicated
by owners for highways, the court is not prepared
to say that a.n acceptance may not be inferred,
under some circumstances, from the action and use
of th~ public generally, without any action by the
body charged with the repair of public roads."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29
The following are additional sections of Revised Stat-

utes 1898:
"Sec. 1115. .A high\vay shall be deen1ed to
have been dedicated and abandoned to the use of
the public ''"hen it has been continuously used as
a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years."
01
Sec. 1116. ...-\.11 high\\·ays once established
must continue to be highways until abandoned by
order of the Board of County Commissioners of the
county in which they are situated, by operation of
law. or by judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction; provided that a road not used or worked
for a period of five years ceases to be a highway."
"Sec. 1117. The width of all public highways,
except alleys, lanes and trails, shall be at least
sixty-six feet. The width of all private highways
and byways, except bridges, shall be at least
twenty feet. Provided that nothing in this title
shall be construed so as to increase or diminish
either kind of highway established or used as
such."
The law now in effect is set forth in Sees. 2802 and
2803, Compiled Laws of 1917, which read:
"Highways once established must continue to
be highways until abandoned by order of the Board
of County Commissioners of the county in which
they are situated, or by a judgment of a court
of competent jurisdiction."
"Sec. 2803. The width of rights of way for
such roads shall be such as will meet the approval
of the State Road Commission and the width of
all rights of way to be used for county roads,
alleys, lanes, trails, private highways and by-roads,
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shall be such as shall be deemed necessary by the
Board of County ~commissioners ; provided that
nothing in this section shall be construed as to
increas·e or d~minish the width of either kind of
highways already estmblishedJ and used as such."
By repeated decisions of this court the law as declared in the statutes just quoted has been recognized
and confirmed, not only when the court had before it
the question of the existence of a public highway, but
also as to the width thereof.
In Whitesides vs. Green (Utah) 44 Pac. 1032, the
court held:
"Where the public have acquired the right to
a public highway by user they are not limited in
width to the actual beaten path; the right carries
with it such width as is reasonably necessary for
the public easement by travel and the width must
be determined from the facts and circumstances
peculiar to such cases."
In Schettler vs. Lynch, 23 Utah 305, 64 Pac. 955, it
is held:
"The dedication of land for a public highway
may be either expressed, as when the owner manifests his purpose by a grant evidenced by writing,
or implied when the acts and conduct of the owner
clearly manifest intention on his part to devote
the land to the public use."
The last adjudication is Lindsay Land & Livestock
Co. vs. Nick Churnos, decided in October, 1929, wherein
this court holds that a highway used prior to the patenting
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of the lands oYer \vhich the san1t:' t;\Xtend~. <.·onferrt'd a
right upon the public to continue to u~e such highway.
The facts in that case are quite ~in1ilar to the fa<.'t~ in
the case at bar. The court recognizes that under the
Federal Statute the use of the high""ay constitutes an
acceptance of the grant ~ade by the Federal Statute,
and further declares that in determining "·hether the
use has been sufficient to establish a high\\·ay that it
is sufficient that it be shown that the road was used
for a variety of purposes and that the use made of it
''was as general and e:\.-tensiYe as the situation and surroundings would permit had the road been formally laid
out as a public highway by public authority."
.A.s to the exact location of the road the court, speak-

ing through Chief Justice Cherry, uses this language:
"\Yith respect to the certainty of the line or
course of the road the eYidence was also sufficient
to support the decree. While the public cannot
acquire a right of way to pass over a tract of land
generally, but only in a certain line or way, it is
not indispensable to the acquisition of the right
that there should be no deviation in the use from a
direct line of travel. If the travel has remained
sufficiently unchanged and the practical indentity
of the road preserved it is sufficient, although
there may have been slight deviations from the
common way to avoid encroachments, obstacles or
obstructions upon the road."
In the case at bar it clearly appears that the only
change made in the road was by Redden and Lake, when
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they were in possession of the Sullivan land, in order
that they might have the use of a little more meadow
land, and as that change was made for . the benefit of
the owners of the land, the appellants cannot now assert
that such change broke the continuity of use of the
highway.
.
This question came before this court in the case of
Bolton vs. Murphy, 127 Pac. 335, and the court, referring
to certain changes in the road, uses this language:
"This was in the early 80's, along about 1883,
when one J. W. Young was the owner of the lands,
and the deflection in question was made at his
request, in order to avoid a railroad grade, which
it seems he was constructing in front of the
premises in question. The deflection was, however,
slight and under the circumstances under which
it was made cannot be considered as having in
any way broken the continuity of the use.
"Any slight change in the traveled track was
made about the year 1903. If it were conceded,
however, that the latter change was such as under
ordinary circumstances would be sufficient to break
the continuity of travel or use, such is not the case
here for the reason that the latter change was,
in effect, made at a time when the right to an
easement by prescription was complete. Under the
undisputed evidence this change comes clearly
within the rule laid down by this court in Thompson vs. Madsen, 29 Utah, where at page 382 (81
Pac. 161), Mr. Justice Straup, speaking for the
court, said : 'If then the predecessors of the defendants in consideration of the closing of said
portion of the north and south alley granted to
plaintiffs and to their predecessors a right of
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'vay oYer the east and "·est alley in lit'U thereof.
"·hich "·as accepted by the phlintiff~ and their
predecessors, the defendants "·ill not now be allowed to close the ne'v or substituted alley. \vithout first reconstructing the old one; and the fact
that such grant 'vas oral matters not, if on the
faith of it rights have been acquired or relinquished
and acted upon.' "
This court~ in the case of Lindsay Land & Livestock
Co. YS. Churnos, supra. affirmed the trial court in decreeing the road to be one hundred feet in 'vidth. In
this case the evidence is ample to show the use of a
roadway three or four rods in width, and the court
fixes the width as one and one-half rods on either side
of the center line as surveyed by Heath.
In addition to the fact that respondent is entitled to
use this roadway as a public highway established over
public domain, and therefore granted by the Federal Statute, and as one continuously used for a period of more
than ten years, and therefore a road established under
the State Statute, there is the equitable consideration, as
shown by the evidence, that Redden, when he took up
the Condas place in 1907 (Tr. 260-261-262) used this
highway over which to haul his materials for his house
and other improvements, and the use that was made of
this road was with the knowledge of the Sullivans and their
predecessors in interest. Redden expended considerable
money in establishing himself on this property, and Condas
purchased the property with such improvements and with

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34

the knowledge and understanding that the road had been
used as a means of ingress and egress to and from the
premises, and without any question ever having been
raised by any occupant of the Sullivan property, until
Sullivan began to object in 1927.
Appellants complain that the court erred in admitting
the testimony of Engineer Heath, who made a survey of
the highway over the Sullivan property. We have already
called attention to the fact that it appears from the record
that appellants would not permit Heath to make a survey
'vhen he first went upon the premises for that purpose,
and that it was necessary for respondent to get an order
of the court in order that the survey might be made.
The refusal to permit the survey, of course, made it impossible for respondent to put Heath on the stand along
with other witnesses for respondent, and it was not until
appellants' witnesses had testified that Heath had the
survey completed. As shown by the record ( Tr. 64 7-649),
appellants' objection to the testimony of Heath was that
it was not proper surrebuttal and was introduced out of
order. To quote:
"MR. SULLIVAN : While he is marking that
we interpose the objection on the ground that the
testimony is not proper surrebuttal.
THE ·COURT: I take it that it is not surrebuttal.
MR. STEWAR'T :- It is. simply introduced for
the purpose, your Honor, of specifically showing
the course of the roadway in question, so that the
metes-so that the roadway may be specifically
and definitely fixed.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

85
THE COURT: I take it that your rt\quest now
is to introduce this eYid~nre out of ordt_)r.
:\IR. SlTLLIY..-\X :

\Ye object to it being· introduced out of order. Let n1~ say, just a n1oment,
that a Yery great deal could be said and properly
said about this kind of procedure. In Yit\\v of
the l~oth of time this case has been for trial
and in Yie\Y of the "·ay the plaintiffs were pushed
into the trial. "·e could talk for an hour as to
the impropriety, unjustness and unfairness of this
kind of proceeding. \·re won't take time to say
all that could be said, but we \Yant our objection
and exception to be made if it is allowed.
~IR. S TE\\.•-\RT:
I want to make a record.
Your Honor appreciates the difficulty we haYe
had in getting on the premises at all because of
the plaintiffs' attitude in this case. Vve went up
sev-eral ~ays ago to have this survey and the plaintiffs, while in the course of the survey, ordered us
off the place, and we called attention to the fact
when we rested that there would be another witness
that we would have to call, and this proceeding,
"-hile it is a little out of order, we feel it is justified and ask the court to permit us to introduce
this as a part of our main case.
THE COURT: The objection may be overruled and the plaintiffs may have an exception."

In l\Iusgrave vs. Studebaker Bros. of Utah, 48 Utah

410, 160 Pac. 117, the court uses this language:

"Whether the court will or will not permit
a party to reopen his case upon a certain question
or subject is largely a matter of discretion. No
doubt the court might abuse its discretion in that
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regard and if such were the case relief could be
had on appeal."
It is not apparent how plaintiffs were in any wise
prejudiced by the court permitting the witness Heath to
testify. He was simply giving evidence as to a physical
fact, to wit: the route and course of the highway through
the Sullivan property. This evidence was. material and
as a matter of fact indispensable, in order that the court
might have before it the particular description of the
highway which respondent claims has. long been established
and which he claims the right to us.e in going to and
from his premises. There certainly was no error in the
ruling of the court in permitting such evidence to be
introduced, even though it was out of order.
We respectfully submit that both under the facts
and the law a public highway exists. through the Sullivan
tract, along the route established by the finding and decree, and that the judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

D. B. HEMPSTEAD,
STEWART, ALEXANDER & BUDGE,
Attorneys for Respondent.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

